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THE COMBINATION OF CHEVRON AND
POLITICAL POLARITY HAS AWFUL EFFECTS
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.†
INTRODUCTION
Courts have always given administrative agencies a healthy degree
of deference. In 1984, however, the Court took federal courts on a bold
new path by issuing its famous opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 1 The Court instructed
reviewing courts to reject an agency interpretation of a statute only if
it conflicts with the clear meaning of the statute and to uphold the
agency interpretation if it is a permissible interpretation of an
ambiguous statute. 2 The Court based its new test on the superior
political accountability of agencies headed by people who are
appointed by the president and who can be removed by the president
in comparison with judges who have life tenure.
Scholars and reviewing courts interpreted the Court’s unanimous
opinion as an instruction to lower courts to replace the multi-factor test
that the Court had announced in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 3 with the
simple, easy to satisfy Chevron test. Under Skidmore, reviewing courts
were required to consider the quality of an agency’s reasoning and the
consistency of its interpretations in the process of deciding whether to
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1. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. The Court in Chevron explained the test,
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842–43.
3. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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uphold an agency interpretation. 4 Chevron immediately attracted the
attention of scholars. Some praised it, while others decried it. Chevron
has become one of the most frequently cited and intensely debated
opinions in history. By 2017, it had been cited in over 15,000 judicial
decisions and 17,000 books and law review articles. 5
For over thirty years, I was one of the strongest supporters of
Chevron deference. I was initially enthusiastic about the Chevron
framework because it required courts to give effect to democratic
values in the process of reviewing agency decisions. In recent years,
however, the increasing political polarity in America makes Chevron,
as originally envisioned, a source of extreme instability in our legal
system. Political polarity combined with Chevron will create (and has
already created) radical changes in the meaning of numerous laws
every few years. Radical and vacillating changes in law deter
investment in regulated industries and make it impossible for
Americans to be able to rely on any stable legal regime as the basis for
their decisionmaking in many important contexts.
The Supreme Court has added qualifications to the original
Chevron test that make it functionally much closer to the Skidmore
test. The lower courts have failed to get the message, however. As a
result, circuit courts apply Chevron with so much deference that it
produces undue instability in our legal system. For example, in Mozilla
Corp. v. Federal Communication Commission, 6 the D.C. Circuit upheld
the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) fourth
inconsistent interpretation of the same statute in fifteen years. 7
Because of its unacceptable destabilizing effect, Chevron should be
replaced with a multi-factor test akin to Skidmore, which focuses more
on expertise and continuity than expansive deference to politically
accountable agencies.

4. The Court in Skidmore explained the less deferential standard of review that preceded
Chevron as follows:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations, and opinions of the Administrator under
this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Id. at 140.
5. Christopher Walker & Kent Barnett, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV.
1, 2 (2017).
6. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
7. Id. at 86.
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In Part I, I explain why I long supported Chevron deference. In
Part II, I explain why Chevron does not yield acceptable results in
today’s conditions of political polarity. In Part III, I explain why the
multi-factor Skidmore test provides a far better means of reconciling
the need for deference to agency policy decisions with the extreme and
growing polarity that now characterizes the U.S. political environment.
In Part IV, I explain why the many controversies about the legitimacy
of the administrative state, including the debate about the appropriate
amount of deference to confer on agency policy decisions, have a single
source—the inability of Congress to engage in bipartisan legislative
action. Finally, in Part V, I suggest ways in which Congress can increase
its ability to enact bipartisan statutes that reduce the need to rely on
agencies to make virtually all major policy decisions.
I. THE ADVANTAGES OF CHEVRON
The Chevron test has many advantages that explain why I was one
of its most enthusiastic supporters for decades. 8 I was greatly
influenced by the reasons the Court gave in support of its new, more
deferential approach to judicial review of agency actions, including
democratic legitimacy, the proper allocation of policymaking
authority, and political accountability for policy decisions. While
reviewing courts have always conferred considerable deference on
agencies, the prior tests were based primarily on comparative
expertise. For example, the Commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, who understand nuclear reactors and attempt to make
sense of the Atomic Energy Act on a daily basis, are in a better position
to adopt a sensible interpretation of the statute they administer than
are generalist judges, who know nothing about nuclear reactors and
might have occasion to review an agency interpretation of the Atomic
Energy Act once every few years. Given that basis for deference, the
traditional tests include a reference to the quality of the data and
analysis that the agency relied on as the basis for its interpretation.
Thus, for instance, the Skidmore test instructs a reviewing court to
assess “the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, and
the validity of its reasoning.” 9
Chevron was the first opinion in which the Court anchored judicial
deference to agency policy decisions in constitutional allocations of
8. See generally Richard Pierce, Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988) (praising the Chevron
doctrine “as an exceedingly important development in administrative law”).
9. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
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decisionmaking power and the basic principles that underlie our
constitutional democracy. The Court began by recognizing that, when
Congress confers power on an agency in a statute and gives an agency
clear instructions with respect to the meaning of the statute, it is the
Court’s job to enforce the will of Congress and to keep the agency from
straying outside the boundaries Congress created. 10 Conversely, when
Congress confers power on an agency in a statute and uses language
that can bear more than one meaning, Congress has implicitly
delegated the power to interpret the ambiguous statutory language to
some other institution—either the agency or a reviewing court. 11 By
interpreting the ambiguous language of the statute, that institution
necessarily is making a policy decision on behalf of the government
that Congress did not make. 12
The Court found it easy to choose between courts and agencies in
the context of policymaking. 13 Judges are the least politically
accountable government officials. If we dislike a policy decision made
by a judge, we cannot change that decision except through the arduous
process of persuading Congress to overturn the policy decision through
legislative action. Because federal judges have life tenure and can only
be removed through the impeachment process, they are more insulated
from the views of the public than any other government official. That
gives them the freedom to make policy decisions that reflect their
personal preferences even if those decisions conflict with the views of
the public. The multi-factor Skidmore test is malleable enough to allow
judges to indulge their understandable tendency to make decisions that
reflect their personal policy preferences. The simple two-step Chevron
test reduced the discretion of judges to substitute their policy
preferences for those of an agency.
By contrast, agency heads are accountable to the public through
their relationship with the elected president. If we dislike a policy
decision made by an agency, we can express our displeasure by voting
against the president (or his political party) in the next election. It
follows that agencies have a political incentive to make policy decisions
that reflect the views of the public. Moreover, if agencies make policy
decisions that the public dislikes, the next president can change those
policies so that they are consistent with the views of the public.
10. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
11. Id. at 843–44, 864.
12. The Court used policy decisions as a synonym for decisions to adopt an interpretation
of an ambiguous statute in many places in its opinion. See, e.g., id.
13. Id. at 865–66.
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My enthusiasm for Chevron increased when I read the article in
which Professor Peter Strauss linked Chevron to the geographic scope
of federal statutes. 14 The Strauss argument was simple and persuasive.
It is highly desirable to have a legal regime in which federal statutes
have the same meaning everywhere. 15 By conferring more
interpretative deference on agencies, Chevron increases the likelihood
that a federal statute will be given the same meaning throughout the
country. 16 By contrast, the less deferential multi-factor Skidmore test
conferred de facto discretion on judges to adopt different
interpretations of statutes. 17 Since the judiciary is organized by
geographic circuits, and the Supreme Court lacks the resources
required to resolve all conflicts among the circuits, the Skidmore test
often produces a legal regime in which the law governing some
important area of federal responsibility varies depending on the circuit
in which each citizen lives. 18
I also applauded when the Supreme Court issued its decision in
National Cable and Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services. 19 The Court held that stare decisis does not preclude an
agency from adopting a different permissible interpretation of an
ambiguous statute after a court has upheld an inconsistent agency
interpretation. The Brand X holding follows logically from the test the
Court announced in Chevron. When a court upholds an agency
interpretation of a statute through application of the Chevron test, it is
necessarily holding only that the statute is ambiguous and that the
agency’s interpretation is permissible. Both of those holdings are
entirely consistent with a holding that the new agency interpretation of
the ambiguous statute is also permissible even if it is inconsistent with
the prior agency interpretation that the court upheld.
Recent studies have found that the Chevron test still has the
political accountability advantages and national uniformity advantages

14. See generally Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases a Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Reviewing Agency Actions, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093
(1987) (noting that the result of Chevron would be agency deference, and in turn creating a
uniform interpretation of the law as created by the agency).
15. Id. at 1105.
16. Id. at 1120–21.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1117–20.
19. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). I
argued in support of the approach the Court later took in Brand X. Richard Pierce, Reconciling
Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L. J. 2225, 2258–60 (1988).
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that it had when the Court issued the opinion. 20 The political
accountability advantages may actually have increased as a result of the
series of opinions that the Court has issued since Chevron that
increased the degree of control that the president can exercise over
agency decisionmakers. 21 Yet, I have changed my opinion about the
desirability of the Chevron test over the last few years. Starting in the
next Part, I will explain why I have decided that we can no longer afford
to bear the costs of the Chevron test.
II. CHEVRON AND POLITICAL POLARITY
Political polarity has increased dramatically over the last thirty
years. 22 The election and impeachment of President Donald Trump are
symptoms of that political polarity. Even after the recent election of a
president who is committed to an effort to bring Americans closer
together, there is no reason to believe that the decades-long trend
toward increased political polarity will stop any time soon. The
combination of the election of a Democratic President by a narrow
margin with Republican gains in House seats in an election
characterized by an unprecedented level of animosity reflects the
continued existence of fundamental disagreements about the policies
the government should implement in the future.
Chevron deference and high political polarity are incompatible.
For present purposes, I am referring to the original version of the
Chevron test. Over the decades in which the Court has applied the
Chevron test, it has qualified the test in many ways. 23 That highly
20. See, e.g., Christopher Walker, Kent Barnett & Christina Boyd, Administrative Law:
Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1523–26 (2018) (finding that Chevron’s goals to
reduce political partisanship in judicial decisionmaking and to promote national uniformity are
quite effective).
21. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010)
(holding that an officer of the United States cannot be insulated from presidential control by two
or more layers of statutory “for cause” limits on the president’s power to remove the officer).
22. In a Politically Polarized Era, Sharp Divides in Both Partisan Coalitions, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/in-a-politically-polarizedera-sharp-divides-in-both-partisan-coalitions [https://perma.cc/DL9R-U8B7]; Frank Newport,
The Impact of Increased Political Polarization, GALLUP (Dec. 5, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/
opinion/polling-matters/268982/impact-increased-political-polarization.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q5UQ-N6U8]; The Shift in American Public Political Values, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/interactives/political-polarization-19942017 [https://perma.cc/JR7F-QWWM].
23. Scholars and courts consider the Chevron test, and the test the Court announced for
application to agency interpretations of agency rules in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), to
be analogous. The Court has applied identical limits to each test over the years. See generally
Kristin E. Hickman & Mark R. Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L. REV.
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qualified version of the Chevron test might produce acceptable results
if lower courts correctly applied it. My concerns about the adverse
effects of continued application of the Chevron test are based on my
belief that circuit courts are continuing to apply the test in roughly the
same manner and with about the same results as they did when the
Court first issued the Chevron opinion. I have two types of evidence to
support that belief.
The first type of evidence is the work of Professors Kent Barnett
and Chris Walker, who have conducted by far the most comprehensive
study of circuit court applications of Chevron. In their study, Barnett
and Walker found that circuit courts uphold agency statutory
interpretations twenty percent more often when they apply Chevron
than when they apply the traditional Skidmore test. 24 Second, that
finding is illustrated by some of the most important recent appellate
cases. The D.C. Circuit’s 2019 opinion in Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, is one
of many opinions that illustrate the unfortunate results of the
combination of Chevron and political polarity.
In Mozilla, the D.C. Circuit had to decide whether to uphold or
reject the FCC’s interpretation of the Communications Act of 1934.
The FCC had interpreted the statute to exempt the internet from
regulation. 25 The over 100 pages the court devoted to discussion of that
question demonstrates the challenging nature of the issue. The
interpretative question was particularly difficult to resolve for two
reasons. First, the court was required to decide whether internet
service providers are “common carriers,” as that term is used in the
Communications Act of 1934, 26 when Congress could not possibly have
contemplated the existence of the internet when it enacted the statute
eighty-five years ago. Second, the FCC had been remarkably
inconsistent with respect to this interpretative issue. It had resolved the
issue four times over the prior fifteen years. On each occasion, it
reversed its prior interpretation. 27
The D.C. Circuit finally concluded that it had no choice but to
uphold the FCC’s most recent interpretation notwithstanding the
agency’s remarkable record of inconsistency with respect to both the
HEADNOTES 103 (2019) (noting the convergence of the application of Auer with the application
of Chevron); Christopher Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review,
16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 103 (2018). The Court described the limits it has applied on the Auer
test in the majority opinion in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414 (2019).
24. Walker & Barnett, supra note 5, at 30.
25. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 17–18.
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interpretation and the agency’s reasoning in support of the
interpretation. 28 The court concluded that it was bound to uphold the
agency’s interpretation through application of the Chevron test,
particularly because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X. 29 In
that case, the Ninth Circuit held that a prior FCC interpretation of the
same statute in the same context was arbitrary and capricious because
the agency had previously adopted an inconsistent interpretation and
a circuit court had upheld the prior inconsistent interpretation. 30 The
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and instructed it to apply
Chevron on remand. 31 Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
FCC’s new interpretation on remand notwithstanding its inconsistency
with the prior interpretation. 32 The D.C. Circuit concluded that it was
required to follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit and to uphold the FCC
interpretation even though the result was to allow the FCC to adopt a
new interpretation every time a president of one party replaces a
president of the other party.
The FCC’s history of vacillation in this context and the decisions
of the courts to uphold each of the FCC’s inconsistent interpretations
illustrate the effects of retaining the Chevron test in today’s conditions
of extreme and growing political polarity. The formal legal issue before
the court in each of the cases in which it upheld the FCC’s inconsistent
interpretations of the Communications Act of 1934 was whether an
internet service provider is a “common carrier” under the act. In
political parlance, the issue in each of those cases was whether the FCC
should apply the principles of “net neutrality” to the internet. That is
one of the hundreds of policy issues on which the two political parties
are hopelessly divided. Democrats strongly support net neutrality,
while Republicans oppose it with equal vigor. Not surprisingly, every
time the White House changes hands, the newly elected president
appoints FCC commissioners who dutifully reverse the interpretation
adopted by their predecessors of the opposing party and adopt a new
interpretation that reflects the policy preference of the party that
elected the new president.
Whether net neutrality is a good or bad policy, we have chosen the
worst possible policy in this context. Net neutrality discourages

28. Id. at 86.
29. Id. at 84.
30. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1130–32 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam),
rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
31. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980, 1003.
32. Brand X, 435 F.3d at 1054.
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investment by internet service providers by subjecting them to strict
regulation, but it encourages investment by content providers by
assuring them of equal access to the internet. Conversely, deregulation
of the internet discourages investment by content providers because
they cannot be confident that they will have access to the internet on
fair and impartial terms, but it encourages investment by internet
service providers by assuring them that they will have the freedom to
use the assets in which they invest in ways that maximize the return on
their investments. By combining Chevron with political polarity, we
have adopted a policy that discourages investment by both content
providers and internet service providers.
Our policy of flip-flopping between net neutrality and
deregulation of internet service providers every time the White House
changes hands discourages all investments in the internet. Policy
uncertainty discourages investment. 33 Prospective investors hate
uncertainty. They discount any potential return on investment
significantly if they foresee a substantial risk that they will not be able
to earn an adequate return on their investment because of the risk that
the government will change its policies in ways that reduce or eliminate
their return on that investment. 34 In the context of the internet,
prospective investors must decide whether to make an investment in
conditions in which they know that the government policies that have
a material effect on their investment returns will change with each
change in administration. That is a policy environment that is far worse
than either consistent application of the principles of net neutrality or
consistent rejection of those principles.
The powerful beneficial effects of stable policy on investment
were illustrated well by the changing position of electric utilities in the
context of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) decision
to adopt a limit on mercury emissions that cost utilities billions of
dollars. 35 The utilities joined coal producers and coal-producing states
in opposing the limits at the EPA and initially in litigation in both the
D.C. Circuit 36 and the Supreme Court. 37 When the Supreme Court
reversed the rule and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit to decide
33. Hong Bo & Robert Lensin, Is the Investment-Uncertainty Relationship Nonlinear?, 72
ECONOMICA 307, 328 (2005).
34. Mark J. Koetse, Henri L.F. de Groot & Raymond J.G.M Florax, A Meta-Analysis of the
Investment-Uncertainty Relationship, 76 S. ECON. J. 283, 301–02 (2009).
35. The Supreme Court discussed the process of issuing the limit and the ensuing litigation
in Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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whether to vacate the rule, however, the court refused to vacate the
rule for a good reason. 38 All but one of the utilities had changed sides
and urged the court to allow EPA to keep the emissions limit in effect
to protect the investments the utilities had made in the pollution
control technology that they had purchased and installed to comply
with the emissions limit.
I was not surprised by that change of position. I have attended
many conferences in which utility executives said that, while they
oppose the issuance of a strict limit on mercury emissions, they would
much prefer issuance of such a limit to continued uncertainty. They
explained that they did not know which of two alternative sets of major
investments in generating technology they should make until they
knew what EPA was going to do with respect to mercury emissions. As
a result, they were deferring many important investment decisions. The
decision to defer important investments created a high risk that the
utilities would be unable to meet the needs of their customers at a
reasonable cost under either an EPA decision to adopt a strict limit on
mercury emissions or an EPA decision not to adopt such a limit.
The same analysis applies in each of the hundreds of contexts in
which Democrats and Republicans have opposing and
uncompromising preferences with respect to policy issues on which
investment decisions depend. Three other contexts—healthcare,
immigration, and climate change—illustrate the scope and severity of
the problems created by the combination of extreme political polarity
and Chevron. In each, it is clear to me that a Skidmore-type test, which
focuses more on continuity than political deference, would produce
results that are preferable to the results of application of the Chevron
test.
First, most Democrats support Obamacare, while most
Republicans disapprove of Obamacare. The Supreme Court is about
to decide the fourth case in which an issue of statutory interpretation
will determine the fate of Obamacare. 39 I was delighted when the fivejustice majority that originally upheld the validity of Obamacare
applied the major question exception to the Chevron doctrine. 40 I hope
that the Court continues to take that approach.
The nation can survive either a decision that upholds Obamacare
or a decision that forces Congress to adopt an alternative to
38. White Stallion Energy Ctr. v. EPA, No. 12–1100, 2015 WL 11051103, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 15, 2015).
39. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Texas v. California, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-1019).
40. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
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Obamacare. I am not at all sure that the nation can survive a decision
that places Obamacare in the same situation as net neutrality—it is
legal and in effect when a Democrat is president but it is illegal and
void when a Republican is president. It is easy to predict that such a
policy environment would minimize total investment in healthcare at
great cost to the nation—in dollars and lives. It also would make it
impossible for individuals to make wise decisions about the actions that
they should take to be confident that they will have access to adequate
healthcare.
Similarly, most Democrats strongly support Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) and Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”), two
immigration programs that President Barack Obama adopted to
protect “dreamers” and their families from the risk of deportation. 41
The Trump administration attempted to rescind DACA and DAPA,
but states led by Democratic governors challenged that decision. 42 The
Trump administration argued that the challenge to the validity of that
rescission decision is barred by a provision of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act. 43 I was pleased when the Supreme Court strongly
suggested that either interpretation might be valid if but only if the
agency provides an adequate explanation for the interpretation it
adopts. 44 That result illustrates one of the main virtues of the Skidmore
test—it instructs a court to consider the quality of an agency’s
reasoning when it reviews an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
provision in an agency-administered statute.
If the Court had merely relied on Chevron as the basis for a
decision in which it held that both the Trump administration’s
interpretation and the Democrats’ interpretation are permissible
readings of the statute, it would have created an unstable legal
environment. Dreamers and their families would be protected from
deportation during a Democratic administration but could be deported
at any time during a Republican administration. That kind of radical
policy vacillation would make it impossible for dreamers, their families,
41. The Fifth Circuit held that DACA and DAPA were illegal in Texas v. United States, 809
F. 3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015). An equally divided Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit
decision in United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2271 (2016).
42. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F. 3d 476 (9th Cir.
2018), vacated in part and rev’d in part, 140 S.Ct. 1891 (2020).
43. See Oral Argument of Solicitor General Noel Francisco, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No. 18-587), https://www.oyez.org/cases/
2019/18-587 [https://perma.cc/M7MK-AUZ6].
44. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 140 S. Ct. at 1907.
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and their employers to make decisions that are likely to further their
interests in the future. Thus, for instance, the many hospitals that rely
heavily on dreamers to provide healthcare services during the
pandemic 45 would have no way of knowing whether they will continue
to have access to that valuable pool of talent.
Climate change is another important context in which the policy
preferences of Republicans and Democrats differ completely. The
Obama administration issued an aggressive plan to mitigate
anthropogenic climate change called the Clean Power Plan (“CPP”). 46
The CPP has never been the subject of any court opinion. The Supreme
Court divided in the process of staying it without opinion, 47 and the
Trump administration withdrew it before any court had an opportunity
to review it on the merits. 48 The legality of the CPP is certain to come
before the courts again, now that a Democrat has been elected
president.
Dean Emily Hammond and I wrote an article at a time when we
thought that a court decision with respect to the legality of the CPP was
imminent. 49 We identified a difficult issue of statutory interpretation
that a reviewing court must address in the process of reviewing the
CPP. 50 We expressed our support for a decision upholding the CPP, but
we also urged a reviewing court not to apply the Chevron test in the
process of reviewing the agency’s interpretation of the statute. 51 We
expressed our belief that a decision that upheld the legality of the CPP,
but did so in a way that invited any Republican president to reject its
validity, would be even worse than a decision in which a court held that
the CPP and the statutory interpretation on which it is based are
invalid. 52
A decision upholding the CPP through application of the Chevron
test would have had the effect of discouraging electric utilities from
45. See Maria Sacchetti, ‘Dreamers’ Risk Lives on Pandemic’s Front Lines While They Await
a Decision on Their Own Futures, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2020, 11:58 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/dreamers-risk-lives-on-pandemics-front-lineswhile-they-await-court-ruling/2020/04/11/d34a7b58-76c4-11ea-85cb-8670579b863d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/VM7A-SCKK].
46. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,663 (Oct. 23, 2015).
47. North Dakota v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999, 999 (2016) (mem.).
48. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019).
49. Emily Hammond & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of
Administrative Law and the Electric Grid, 7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 1, 3 (2016).
50. Id. at 4–5.
51. Id. at 7–8.
52. Id. at 6–7.
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making any of the hundreds of billions of dollars of investments in
generating units that are required to provide adequate electricity at a
reasonable cost. The expectation that the CPP will be in effect in the
future would channel investment in one direction while the expectation
that it will not be in effect in the future would channel investment in a
different direction. Uncertainty about whether the CPP will be in effect
in the future discourages investment of all types.
I have reached the conclusion that we can no longer afford
Chevron with regret. The Chevron test continues to have two
important beneficial effects. It increases political accountability for
policy decisions, and it increases the number of federal statutes that
have the same meaning throughout the country. 53 However, when
Chevron is combined with extreme political polarity, it has effects that
are even worse than adoption of bad policies or uncertainty with
respect to the geographic scope of some national policies. The
combination of Chevron and political polarity makes it certain that
government policies in many important contexts will change
dramatically every four to eight years. That effect is intolerable. It
makes it impossible for individuals, corporations, and prospective
investors to make wise decisions.
III. THE SKIDMORE TEST IS SUPERIOR TO THE CHEVRON TEST
The multi-factor Skidmore test 54 is a much better fit with an
environment of extreme political polarity for two reasons. First, the
test refers to an agency interpretation’s “consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements” as a factor a court should consider in deciding
whether to uphold an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 55
The Skidmore test places a high value on policy continuity. In many
contexts, continuity is critically important to wise decisionmaking.
Individuals, corporations, and prospective investors are often better off
having to find ways of coping with a bad policy than trying to make
wise decisions in an environment in which they can predict reliably only
that government policy will change dramatically every four to eight
years. The Supreme Court recently recognized the importance of

53. See Walker & Barnett, supra note 5, at 65 (“Chevron recognized that the political
branches had more accountability than unelected judges and were in a better position to make
policy choices inherent in interpretive issues.”); Walker et al., supra note 20, at 1479–82
(discussing the political accountability and national uniformity rationales underpinning the
Chevron doctrine).
54. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (2014).
55. Id.
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stable policies. In its opinion with respect to the legality of the decision
of the Trump administration to rescind the DACA and DAPA
programs, the Court explicitly imposed a duty on the agency to explain
why its change in policy was sufficiently important to justify the adverse
effects it would have on the expectations of the many individuals and
institutions that had relied on the programs. 56
Second, by referring to “the thoroughness evident in its
consideration [and] the validity of its reasoning,” 57 the Skidmore test
places a high value on the quality of an agency’s reasoning in support
of its interpretation of an ambiguous statute. There are many situations
in which an agency can argue successfully that the language of a statute
can support two or more interpretations, but in which the agency can
support only one of those interpretations with data and analysis. The
Skidmore test tells courts to focus on the quality of the data and
analysis that an agency relies on as the basis for its interpretation and
to uphold an agency interpretation only if it is supported by reliable
data and analysis.
The Skidmore test combines the values of reasoned
decisionmaking and policy continuity to create a policy environment in
which individuals, corporations, and prospective investors can make
wise decisions. If a court upholds an agency interpretation of an
ambiguous statute based on its conclusion that the agency has
supported its interpretation with adequate data and analysis, that court
decision should qualify as stare decisis. A policy adopted by the agency
and upheld by a court through application of the Skidmore test can
only be changed if the agency uses data and analysis to persuade a
reviewing court to uphold a change in policy. That can happen either
as a result of changes in the factual context to which a policy applies or
changes in our understanding of that context. Thus, for instance, the
EPA’s decision to interpret the term “pollutant” in the Clean Air Act
not to include carbon dioxide was supportable until it became clear that
emissions of carbon dioxide are causing catastrophic changes in the
earth’s climate. 58 The Supreme Court has endorsed the healthy way in
which the Skidmore test blends the values of continuity and reasoned
decisionmaking in a long line of opinions. 59
56. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913–15 (2020).
57. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
58. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Court held that EPA was required to
interpret “pollutant” to include carbon dioxide because of its adverse effects on climate change.
Id. at 528–32.
59. Thus, for instance, in Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2120 (2016), and in
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009), the Court held that an agency
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IV. ADDRESSING THE DEFERENCE DEBATE AT ITS SOURCE—
INADEQUATE CONGRESSIONAL CAPACITY TO LEGISLATE
The lively debate about the propriety of conferring a high degree
of deference on agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes is only
one of many debates that have occupied the attention of scholars,
courts, and politicians in recent years. Similar debates about the
legitimacy of the administrative state have focused on whether to
reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine 60 and whether to make it more
difficult for agencies to change their policies by adding procedural
hurdles to the rulemaking process or by requiring congressional
ratification of agency rules. 61 All of those controversies are rooted in
concern that the president has too much power. Many of the
participants in the debates overlook an even more basic source of the
controversies about the legitimacy of the administrative state,
however. Presidents have no choice but to assert unprecedented power
to act in response to serious national problems because Congress has
lost its ability to address problems by enacting legislation.
Conservative Republican politicians and scholars spent the eight
years of the Obama administration criticizing President Obama’s
attempts to expand his power to regulate. Most Democrats defended
those exercises of presidential power until President Trump was
elected. As they watched President Trump attempt to exercise
unprecedented power to deregulate, Democrats became the primary
critics of presidential power. It has now become clear to everyone that
presidential power has expanded dramatically in ways that give the
president policymaking discretion that is no longer subject to adequate
limits imposed by the other branches of government. As a result of that
realization, scholars with widely varying ideological perspectives have

decision to change its interpretation of a statute without providing an adequate explanation for
the change is arbitrary and capricious. See also the recent opinions discussed in Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Reason Trumps Pretext, REGULATORY REV. (July 30, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/
2020/07/30/pierce-reason-trumps-pretext
[https://perma.cc/3U74-HSNS].
Courts
could
incorporate this requirement in applying Step Two of the Chevron test, but they rarely do so. See
Christopher Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2018).
60. The justices engaged in a lively debate about whether to reinvigorate the nondelegation
doctrine in Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
61. The Center for the Study of the Administrative State sponsored a symposium to discuss
the many congressional proposals to add procedures to the rulemaking process. Congress and the
Administrative State: Delegation, Nondelegation and Un-Delegation, C. BOYDEN GRAY CTR. FOR
STUDY ADMIN. STATE (Feb. 22, 2019), https://administrativestate.gmu.edu/events/congress-andthe-administrative-state-delegation-nondelegation-and-un-delegation [https://perma.cc/W7AR4LR9].
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joined to criticize the growing power of the president and to search for
ways of limiting the exercise of that power. 62
Concern about the growing and increasingly unchecked power of
the president has its roots in increased political polarity and in the
legislative impotence that is spawned by political polarity. It is easy to
see the relationships among political polarity, the growing power of the
president, and legislative impotence by imagining that you are an
adviser to a newly elected president in two different periods of time.
First, imagine that you are an adviser to a president who takes
office in the 1960s. Your boss asks you how he can implement his policy
agenda. Your answer would have focused primarily on the prospect of
legislative action. In the 1960s, it was realistic to expect that Congress
would engage in the compromises required to enact a major piece of
legislation with the votes of a bipartisan majority of the members of
both houses of Congress. Thus, for instance, President Richard Nixon
was successful in implementing his environmental policy objectives by
persuading large bipartisan majorities of both houses of Congress to
enact the Clean Air Act and the statute that created the EPA.
Now, imagine that you are an adviser to a president who is elected
in 2020. You would have to begin by telling your boss that he has no
realistic chance of persuading a bipartisan majority of the members of
Congress to enact major legislation in any context. If he is lucky enough
to hold office in some two-year period in which his party controls both
the House and the Senate, he might be able to persuade Congress to
enact one or two pieces of major legislation on straight, party line
votes, with the opposition party vowing to repeal the legislation as soon
as it regains control of the White House, the House, and the Senate.
Thus, for instance, President Obama was able to get Congress to enact
his signature healthcare legislation with no Republican votes and
President Trump was able to persuade Congress to enact his signature
tax cut bill by relying entirely on Republican votes. If the president is
in the more common situation in which either the House or the Senate
is controlled by the opposing party, he has no realistic chance of
persuading Congress to enact any major legislation.
In today’s political environment you would have to advise your
boss that a president has no choice but to rely on some combination of
executive orders and agency actions to implement his policy agenda.
62. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of
Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 549, 562–
607 (2018) (criticizing both the Obama administration and the Trump administration for the
excessive role that both presidents played in immigration and healthcare decisionmaking).
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Moreover, you would have to advise him that he will need to support
those policy decisions as exercises of power that Congress delegated to
the president or to agencies in statutes that were enacted thirty to
eighty years ago. In most cases, the statutes were enacted to address
problems that differ significantly from the problems that the nation
faces today and in conditions that differ significantly from the
conditions that exist today.
V. WAYS OF INCREASING CONGRESSIONAL CAPACITY TO
LEGISLATE
There is a broad consensus among scholars that we would be
better off if we could return to a political environment in which a
president could expect to be able to address major policy problems by
working with Congress to craft bipartisan solutions that can be enacted
in statutes. No one has yet identified ways in which we can reverse the
trend toward political polarity in the general public. However, we can
change the methods we use to choose candidates for office and leaders
of the House and Senate in ways that will reduce the adverse effects of
political polarity on the ability of Congress to enact legislation.
We can begin by changing the way we choose candidates for office.
We rely on party-based primaries as our most frequent method of
choosing candidates for office. That method of choosing candidates
maximizes the adverse effects of political polarity on the performance
of Congress. Party-based primaries are low turn-out elections that
favor candidates whose views lie at the ideological extremes of the
range of views held by the members of their party. 63 The small group
of voters who participate in party-based primaries consist
disproportionately of highly partisan activists who support candidates
with extreme views. 64
Reliance on party-based primaries also deters members of the
House and Senate from engaging in the compromises that are essential
in the process of persuading a bipartisan majority to support a
proposed statute. A large majority of the seats in the House and the
Senate are “safe seats,” in the sense that the incumbent’s party is

63. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 298 (2011); see generally ELAINE C. KAMARCK,
PRIMARY POLITICS: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT HOW AMERICA NOMINATES
ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES (3d ed. 2018) (discussing the effects of primary elections).
64. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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virtually certain to win all general elections for the foreseeable future. 65
Those seats are not “safe” in the context of a party-based primary,
however.
The only realistic political risk that most members of the House
and Senate face is the risk of losing a primary. For Republicans, that
risk comes mainly from the right. For Democrats, the risk comes
mainly from the left. Republicans who move toward the center to
compromise on a bill risk losing a primary to a candidate who is to their
right. Democrats who move to the center to compromise on a bill risk
losing a primary to a candidate who is to their left. The only way that
incumbents can protect themselves from being “primaried” is to take
extreme partisan positions and to avoid compromises.
Members of the House and Senate must be willing to compromise
in order to enact bipartisan legislation. In today’s conditions of extreme
political polarity, it is impossible to put together a bipartisan majority
to enact a statute that has been created through the process of
compromise. If we want to return to a political environment in which a
bipartisan coalition of members of Congress can enact, amend, or
repeal legislation, we must identify and implement an alternative to
party-based primaries.
The two most promising alternatives are the peer-based systems
that most democracies use to choose candidates for office and the
bipartisan primaries that some states are now using for that purpose. 66
Either of those alternatives is far more likely to produce candidates
whose views are closer to the center of the range of views of the
members of their party. Either will also produce members of the House
and Senate who are far more willing to negotiate the compromises that
are essential to successful enactment of statutes because they will not
be in constant fear that they will be “primaried” by more extreme and
less compromising candidates.
We also must change our method of choosing leaders of the House
and Senate. We now use methods of choosing the leaders of the House
and Senate that maximize the adverse effects of political polarity on
the legislative process. The leaders of both Houses of Congress
regularly refuse to allow members to vote on legislation that is
supported by a majority of House or Senate members and by a majority
65. See 2020 House Race Ratings, COOK POL. REP. (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings [https://perma.cc/NA3U-HWHB]; 2020
Senate Election Forecasts, 270TOWIN (June 1, 2020), https://www.270towin.com/2020-senateelection-predictions [https://perma.cc/8YZS-X8A4].
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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of the general public. These party leaders have no choice but to engage
in that undemocratic pattern of conduct because they are elected by a
majority of the members of their party—who are in turn fearful of
being “primaried.”
Thus, for instance, if Republicans control 51 Senate seats, 26
Republicans can successfully block a vote on a bill that would be
enacted by a vote of 74 to 26 if it was subject to a floor vote. The
Republican leader of the Senate knows that he would risk losing his
leadership position if he angers a majority of the members of his party
by allowing the Senate to vote to enact a statute that is opposed by a
majority of Republican members of the Senate.
Similarly, if Democrats control 218 House seats, the Speaker of
the House cannot allow a floor vote on a bill that would be enacted by
a vote of 325 to 110 if the 110 who oppose the bill are members of the
Democratic Party. The Democratic Speaker knows that she would risk
losing her position if she allowed a vote on a bill that is opposed by a
majority of the members of her party. We can eliminate this
undemocratic roadblock to legislation by requiring a vote by a super
majority of each house of Congress to elect a leader. Such a leader
would have an incentive to allow members to vote on any bill that has
the support of most of the members of the House and Senate and,
presumptively, of the public.
Some people will object to proposed changes of this type based on
a claim that they are undemocratic. They will argue that all decisions
should be made by majority vote in a democracy. That is a specious
argument. It should be apparent to anyone who gives the question
serious thought that our present methods of choosing candidates for
office combined with our present methods of choosing the leaders of
the House and the Senate produce undemocratic results. They allow a
small minority of the members of each party to block the enactment of
legislation that is supported by a large majority of the public.
CONCLUSION
I look forward to the day when we can reduce the level of
controversy that surrounds the administrative state by returning to a
political environment in which Congress is capable of enacting
bipartisan legislation. Congress should be willing and able to enact
statutes that empower agencies to implement solutions to the many
serious problems that the nation confronts within judicially
enforceable boundaries. Until we can restore the capacity to legislate,
courts must adopt and apply legal doctrines that produce acceptable
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results in an extremely polarized political environment. Chevron is not
capable of producing acceptable results in today’s political
environment. The Court should replace the Chevron test with the
Skidmore test.

